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LEGISLATION
MARYLAND'S DRUNK DRIVING LAWS:
AN OVERVIEW
"'All the king's horses and all the king's men cannot change the
position of road curves, telephone poles, fences and railway
crossings often or quickly enough to meet the changing Mien-
tions of the driver who is under the influence of alcohol"1
I. INTRODUCTION
Approximately seven hundred ?eople are killed in traffic accidents
on Maryland highways each year. In ninety percent of those acci-
dents, the drivers at fault have been drinking.3 Despite these statistics,
Maryland has remained among the minority of jurisdictions that re-
quire a blood alcohol content (BAC)4 of .15% to prove intoxication.'
Recent legislation has modified this and other enforcement provisions
of Maryland's drunk driving laws.
This article provides an overview of the current drunk driving laws
in Maryland with an emphasis on changes implemented in the 1981
and 1982 legislative sessions.6 Because the recent changes to the drunk
driving laws are principally related to enforcement measures, these
laws are presented in a chronological fashion, beginning with the of-
ficer's initial stop of a suspected drunk driver, proceeding through the
arrest of a suspected drunk driver, and concluding with the imposition
of administrative sanctions. Possible problems with the new laws are
also noted.
1. Porter, The Problem as Viewed by the Judge in Alcohol and the Automobile Driver
A Symposium, 44 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 212, 213 (1940), cited
in Cameron, The Impact of Drinking-Driving Countermeasures: A Review and
Evaluation, 8 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 495, 497 (1979).
2. MD. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE DRINK-
ING DRIVER 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE].
3. Id The problem of drunk drivers existed nationally as early as 1938, and by
1940, it was becoming the number one traffic safety problem. Cameron, The Im-
pact of Drinking-Driving Countermeasures: A Review and Evaluation, 8 CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 495, 496, 502-03 (1979). Alcoholics, although a small minority of
the population, accounted for a large part of the overall highway safety problem.
Legislation has been enacted by the United States Congress to establish a
program that provides mandatory minimum standards to assure tougher drunk
driving laws, more stringent enforcement of these laws, and on-going effective
public information regarding drunk driving. States implementing this program
would be entitled to receive additional federal funding. Alcohol Traffic Safety
and National Driver Registration Acts, Pub. L. No. 97-364 (Oct. 25, 1982).
4. Blood alcohol content is the percentage, by weight, of the amount of alcohol in the
blood. I R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 15.04 (3d ed. 1980).
5. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(e) (1980) (amended 1981).
6. This article will not address motor vehicle homicide, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 388, 388A (1976 & Supp. 1981), nor will it address the criminal penalties for a
drunk driving conviction.
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II. THE STOP OF A SUSPECTED DRUNK DRIVER
In order to lawfully stop or detain the operator of a motor vehicle
for the offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI),7 an officer must
have reasonable grounds to believe the individual is or has been driv-
ing a motor vehicle while intoxicated or while under the influence of
alcohol.' The 1981 legislature has authorized the use of a preliminary
breath test to assist police in detecting motorists who have been drink-
ing.9 This test may be administered following the lawful stop of a mo-
torist. 1o An officer may, without making an arrest and prior to issuing a
traffic citation, " request the motorist to submit to a preliminary breath
test. The officer must advise the motorist that neither refusing the test
nor taking the test will prevent or require a subsequent chemical test.' 2
A refusal by the motorist to submit to the preliminary test does not
7. The authority of a police officer to stop a motorist for drunk driving is statutorily
provided in MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(c) (Supp. 1981). However, this
is not the only source of authority for an officer to stop or detain a motorist.
Montgomery County Police have recently implemented a safety checkpoint proce-
dure to detect drunk drivers. All oncoming traffic is stopped by an officer for a
period of thirty seconds or less. If during the brief stop the officer concludes the
motorist has been drinking, the motorist is requested to drive to the side of the
road and the officer proceeds with the inquiry. Telephone interview with Bruce P.
Sherman, Assistant Montgomery County Attorney (Jan. 22, 1981). In Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Supreme Court noted with approval spot checks
of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops. See also United States v. Prich-
ard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981); Gode v. State, 41 Md. App. 623, 398 A.2d 801
(1979).
8. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(d) & (e) (Supp. 1981). The expres-
sion "driving while under the influence of alcohol" has been substituted for and
has the same meaning as "driving while ability impaired by alcohol." Law of
May 3, 1982, ch. 95, 1982 Md. Laws 1223.
"Driving" is defined as "to drive, operate, move, or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle, including the exercise of control over or the steering of a
vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle." MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 11-114
(1977). In Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 353 A.2d 256 (1976), the court held that
"drive" had a narrower meaning than either operating or being in actual physical
control of the vehicle and required movement in some direction plus steering and
controlling the vehicle. Id at 319, 353 A.2d at 259.
"Motor vehicle" is defined as a vehicle that is "self-propelled or propelled by
electric power obtained from overhead electrical wires" and is "not operated on
rails." MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 11-135(a) (1977).
9. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.2 (Supp. 1981).
10. Id Maryland State Police use the "Alco-Sensor" by Intoximeter, Inc. to adminis-
ter the preliminary breath test. The "Alco-Sensor," like the chemical breath test,
detects the presence of alcohol in the breath and gives a percentage reading. Tele-
phone interview with Lt. David Yoder of the Maryland State Police (Aug. 7, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Yoder Interview]. The preliminary breath test can be admin-
istered by any police officer in the field, without a need for special training or
certification. Id
11. A traffic citation is a charging document upon which the State may proceed to
trial, notwithstanding that the officer did not support the citation by oath. State v.
Dodd, 17 Md. App. 693, 304 A.2d 846 (1973).
12. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.2(d) (Supp. 1981).
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result in the imposition of administrative penalties. 3 The preliminary
breath test results will only be used as a guide for the officer in deciding
whether to arrest the motorist.'4 Although the defendant is free to in-
troduce into evidence at trial the results of the preliminary breath test,
the State is not permitted to introduce such evidence for purposes of
proving its case in chief.'5
Because of the restrictions placed upon the use of the preliminary
breath test results, the defendant should submit to the preliminary test
in most instances. If alcohol is detected, the individual would still be
free to refuse the chemical test; however, if no alcohol or an insufficient
amount of alcohol is detected, the motorist can then use these results to
his advantage in any subsequent proceeding. Thus, while the purpose
of the preliminary breath test is to aid the police, it is the motorist who
benefits from its use.
III. THE ARREST OF A SUSPECTED DRUNK DRIVER
A. Refusal to Submit to Chemical Testing
Implied consent laws were passed in many states during the 1950's
to encourage drivers to submit to chemical testing. 16 These statutes
were based upon the rationale that a condition precedent for the privi-
lege' 7 of driving upon the highways of a state was a driver's consent to
permit chemical testing whenever properly requested.' If the driver
refused the test, he was deemed to have withdrawn his consent, which
resulted in a failure of the condition precedent to a license; hence, the
13. Id
14. Id § 16-205.2(c).
15. Id The state could, however, use such evidence for impeachment purposes. See
United States v. Havens, 444 U.S. 962 (1980). Neither party can use any evidence
pertaining to the preliminary breath test in a civil action. MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 16-205.2(c) (Supp. 1981). Since the evidentiary limitations relate solely to
court action, it would appear that eitherthe State or the defendant could use evi-
dence pertaining to the preliminary breath test at a hearing before the Motor Ve-
hicle Administration.
16. The first state to pass an implied consent statute was New York. Now all fifty
states have some type of implied consent statute. Note, Driving While Intoxicated
and the Right to Counsel- The Case Against Implied Consent, 58 TEx. L. REv. 935,
938 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Right to Counsel].
17. Driving is a privilege, not a right. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 11-128(2)(ii)
(1977).
18. See Right to Counsel, supra note 16, at 938. Prior to chemical testing, a conviction
for drunk driving usually depended upon the arresting officer's testimony regard-
ing the defendant's condition at the time of the incident. His condition as mani-
fested by his actions, appearance, speech, and odor was determined by general
observation and the use of nonscientific tests. These tests included requiring the
defendant to walk a straight line, touch the tip of his nose with a finger, or recite
the alphabet. Comment, The Theory and Practice of Implied Consent in Colorado,
47 U. COLO. L. REV. 723, 724 (1976). The chemical testing of BAC produced new
evidence which, because of its scientific basis, provided greater reliability. How-
ever, drivers were reluctant to submit to the testing. 53 N.D. L. REV. 607, 608
(1977).
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state revoked the conditional privilege of driving.19
Maryland's current implied consent statute provides that any per-
son who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or
any private property used by the public in general has consented to
taking a chemical test when properly requested.2 ° An arrestee must
choose between submitting to chemical testing or refusing and incur-
ring the administrative penalties that shall be imposed.2'
In Schmerber v. California, 22 the United States Supreme Court
held that a blood test was a "search" and thus required a warrant in the
absence of any exigent circumstances. 23 However, because alcohol in
the bloodstream dissipates quickly after an individual stops drinking,
the Court found that such exigent circumstances exist any time an of-
ficer makes a lawful stop of a suspected drunk driver.24 The officer
must have probable cause to believe he will find evidence of the of-
fense, and the search must be conducted in a reasonable manner.25
In light of Schmerber, the Maryland implied consent statute cre-
19. See Right to Counsel, supra note 16, at 938. Maryland currently has one of the
highest refusal rates in the nation, with approximately 28% of those persons
charged refusing to take the chemical test. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra
note 2, at 8.
20. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(a) (Supp. 1981). The new statute eliminates
the condition precedent of consent upon issuance or renewal of a license and im-
plies consent whenever an individual drives. Compare id with MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(a) (1977). By using the terminology "any person," all resi-
dents, non-residents, licensed and non-licensed drivers are within the purview of
the statute. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 11-139, -149 (Supp. 1981). "Private
property used by the public in general" is not defined by statute. It would appear
that private property need not be designated for use as a roadway. For example,
parks, beaches, and shopping center parking lots would all be within the purview
of the implied consent statute.
Subsection (d) of section 16-205.1 further provides that a police officer may
order a chemical test for alcohol to be taken from one who is unconscious or
otherwise incapable to refuse the testing. If an individual becomes capable of
refusing before the test is administered, the police officer must follow the proce-
dures in section 16-205.1(c). Laws of May 3, 1982, ch. 91, 1982 Md. Laws 1214 (to
be codified at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(d)).
21. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(a) (Supp. 1981).
22. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
23. Id at 770.
24. Id at 770-71. The Court analogized the oxygenization of alcohol in the body to
the destruction of evidence, which creates an emergency situation in which ob-
taining a warrant would be unfeasible. Id
25. Id Maryland has statutoriJy limited the methods by which a motorist may be
searched for evidence of alcohol to (1) breath tests administered by qualified per-
sons, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-304(a)(3) (Supp. 1980), and (2) the
withdrawal of blood by a qualified medical person. Id § 10-304(a)(2). "Qualified
persons" is defined as a person who has received training in the use of the breath-
testing equipment in a program approved by the toxicologist of the Office of the
Chief Medical Examiner of the Department of Postmortem Examiners and who is
either a police officer, a police employee, or an employee of the Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner. Id § 10-304(a)(3). A "qualified medical person" is defined
as any person permitted by law to withdraw blood from humans. Id § 10-
304(a)(2).
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ates a paradox. While the statute is designed to encourage drivers to
submit to chemical testing, it actually creates the option for the driver
to refuse chemical testing. As a result of Schmerber, a driver could be
compelled to submit to BAC testing, absent an implied consent stat-
ute.26 The statute, therefore, appears to defeat the purpose for which it
was enacted.27
After arresting a motorist for drunk driving, the officer may re-
quest that the individual submit to a chemical test of his blood or
breath to determine his BAC.28 In the event that the arrestee refuses to
permit such testing, a fact that cannot be introduced at trial,29 the of-
ficer must advise the individual of the administrative penalties that
shah be imposed.3 ° Within forty-eight hours after detaining the indi-
vidual, the officer must file a sworn report with the Motor Vehicle Ad-
ministration (hereinafter referred to as the Administration), stating that
the motorist has been drinking and driving and had refused to permit
26. Maryland's implied consent statute has imposed greater restrictions on police ac-
tivity than those required by the Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution.
See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
27. See Right to Counsel, supra note 16, at 947.
The 1982 legislature has provided that when a motor vehicle accident results
in the death of another person and a police officer has reasonable grounds to
believe one was driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated or under the in-
fluence, the person shall be required to submit to chemical testing. Law of May 3,
1982, ch. 100, 1982 Md. Laws 1250 (to be codified at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 16-205.1(c)).
28. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(c)(2) (Supp. 1981). The accused must af-
firmatively consent to the administration of a chemical test. State v. Loscomb, 291
Md. 424, 437, 435 A.2d 764, 770-71 (1981).
It is unclear whether one has a right to counsel when deciding whether to
refuse or permit BAC testing. Compare Leopold v. Tofany, 68 Misc. 2d 3, 325
N.Y.S.2d 24 (holding there is a right to counsel), af'd, 38 A.D.2d 550, 327
N.Y.S.2d 999 (1971) with Right to Counsel, supra note 16, at 945 (if the right to
counsel exists in this situation, it should be eliminated by compelling chemical
testing of all drivers suspected of driving while intoxicated).
The Supreme Court of Oregon has held that a defendant was not in "cus-
tody" and thus Miranda warnings were not mandated, when following several
field sobriety tests the police officer determined to arrest the defendant but did not
communicate that determination to him or utter any words of arrest before ques-
tioning the defendant on the degree of his intoxication. State v. Roberti, 293 Or.
59, 644 P.2d 1104, cert.fled, [Current Docket] S. Ct. Bull. (CCH) 7083 (U.S. Aug.
20, 1982) (No. 82-315).
29. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309 (1977). An inquiry regarding the
defendant's refusal would constitute plain error. Major v. State, 31 Md. App. 590,
603, 358 A.2d 609, 617, cert. denied, 278 Md. 722 (1976). On the other hand, if the
defendant requested a BAC test and the officer refused, the defendant could offer
that fact into evidence. Id There is a split among the jurisdictions as to whether
the motorist's refusal to permit the testing is constitutionally admissible at trial.
See Right to Counsel, supra note 16, at 946. The Supreme Court of South Dakota
has held that a defendant's exercise of his statutory right to refuse to submit to
blood testing cannot constitutionally be used against him by the prosecution to
prove its case in chief. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), cert. granted,
[Current Docket] S. Ct. Bull. (CCH) 7022 (U.S. May 17, 1982) (No. 81-1453).
30. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(c)(3) (Supp. 1981).
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chemical testing after being informed of the administrative penalties
that would be imposed upon his refusal.3
Upon receipt of the officer's report, the Administration shall notify
the motorist to attend a hearing and show cause why his license should
not be suspended.32 At the hearing, the driver may present evidence
concerning his refusal to take the test.33 Failure of the arrestee to at-
tend the administrative hearing is prima facie evidence of his inability
to answer the officer's statements and the Administration will summa-
rily suspend his license.34
If the Administration determines that the driver refused to permit
the testing as alleged, it shall suspend the arrestee's license for a period
not less than sixty days nor more than six months.3 The suspension,
however, may be modified or a restricted license issued if (1) the licen-
see is required to drive in the course of his employment, (2) a driver's
license is required so that the licensee may attend an alcoholic preven-
tion or treatment program, or (3) the licensee has no other means of
transportation available and his ability to earn a living would be se-
verely impaired without his license.36
One commentator notes that it is in the arrestee's best interest to
refuse the BAC test. 37 The penalty for refusal is civil in nature, usually
involving license suspension, whereas, if the arrestee permits BAC test-
ing, he subjects himself to criminal liability, including fines and/or im-
prisonment, as well as revocation or suspension of his license.38
Therefore, it may benefit the arrestee to refuse the chemical test unless
he is certain the results of the testing will be favorable to him.
39
31. Id § 16-205.1(c)(4).
32. Id § 16-205.1(e). Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (an issued driver's li-
cense may not be suspended without compliance with the procedural due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment). Notice shall be given in accordance
with MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 12-202 (1977) and the hearing must occur within
thirty days from the officer's stop of the driver. Id § 16-205. 1(e)(2) (Supp. 1981).
33. MD. TRA&NsP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(e)(3) (Supp. 1981). At the hearing, the mo-
torist may be represented by counsel. Id
34. Id § 16-205. 1(e)(4).
35. Id If the Administration finds that an individual was properly charged but re-
fused to permit chemical testing, his license shall be suspended unless the officer
lacked probable cause to make the stop or the individual has a medical problem
which caused his erratic driving. Telephone interview with William T.S. Bricker,
Director, Motor Vehicle Administration for the State of Maryland (Jan. 17, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Bricker Interview]. The order of suspension by the Adminis-
tration is appealable. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(f) (Supp. 1981).
36. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(e)(5)(i)-(iii) (Supp. 1981). It is within the
discretion of the administrative hearing officer to modify the suspension or issue a
restricted license. The burden is upon the individual to prove, by strict proof, that
he falls within one of the exceptions. Bricker Interview, supra note 35.
37. Right to Counsel, supra note 16, at 947.
38. Id
39. A motorist's refusal to permit BAC testing does not prohibit the police from pro-
ceeding with criminal charges. In fact, it is a standard procedure of the Maryland
State Police to seek a conviction for drunk driving regardless of whether the mo-
[Vol. II
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B. Submission to Chemical Testing
Maryland permits two types of chemical testing: breath and
blood.' The arrestee, not the police officer, is given the choice of
which method will be used.41 If the method chosen is one which can-
not be administered within two hours, then no test may be given and
the officer's inability to administer the test is not admissible at trial.42
Furthermore, the inability of the officer to administer a test may not be
considered a refusal to submit nor may any presumption of guilt be
deduced from it.43 If the arrestee initially selects a test which is capable
of being administered within the legal time limit, but subsequently
chooses a test which cannot be administered within the legal time limit,
the officer may choose the testing method.' A denial by the arrestee to
torist consents to BAC testing. Yoder Interview, supra note 10. In the absence of
chemical evidence, the State may meet its burden of proof by having the arresting
officer testify as to the defendant's demeanor at the time of the arrest.
40. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-302 (Supp. 1981). Maryland, by impli-
cation, has excluded BAC testing by means of gas chromotography, urine, and
saliva. See id For an explanation of how the breath test works, see 1 R. ERWIN,
DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 15.01 (3d ed. 1980); Bellotti, The Prepara-
tion and Trial of a Drunken Driving Case Involving a Breathayzer, I NAT'L J.
CRIM. DEF. 131 (1975).
After the chemical testing of an individual is completed, the test ampoule,
that is, the residue remaining after the chemical testing, is discarded. This proce-
dure has recently come under attack. California has held that a case may be dis-
missed "unless the prosecution can show that the governmental agencies involved
have established, enforced and attempted in good faith to adhere to vigorous and
systematic procedures designed to preserve" such evidence. People v. Hitch, 527
P.2d 361, 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 17 (1974). Missouri requires that the test ampoule
be preserved. State v. Baker, 490 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1973) (affirmed defendant's
conviction because he failed to show he was prejudiced by disposal of the am-
poule).
Section 10-306 of Maryland's Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Anno-
tated, which provides that if the state intends to offer the chemical test results into
evidence without the testimony of the technician who administered the test, a
copy of the test results must be supplied to the defendant at least fifteen days
before trial, does not address the issue regarding the ampoule. See MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-306 (1980).
41. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-305(a) (Supp. 1981). The specimen of
blood or breath shall be taken within two hours after the person is apprehended.
Id § 10-303. If the specimen is taken more than two hours after the apprehen-
sion, the evidence may be excluded at a criminal trial. Major v. State, 31 Md.
App. 590, 595, 358 A.2d 609, 612 (construing MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 10-309(a) (Supp. 1979)), cert. denied, 278 Md. 722 (1976). Since § 10-303 relates
to the time limitations imposed upon obtaining the specimen, it would appear that
testing which followed the withdrawal of the specimen could occur after the two-
hour limit. It is the actual testing of the specimen that is crucial, not when the
results are reduced to writing. See State v. Moon, 291 Md. 463, 436 A.2d 420
(1981). It is unclear, however, if this rationale would apply when testing of the
specimen occurred several days following its withdrawal.
42. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 16-305(a) (Supp. 1981).
43. Id
44. Id § 10-303 (1980). Since Maryland recognizes only two types of chemical test-
ing, the officer can only choose the test first requested by the arrestee.
19821 363
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permit the test chosen by the officer will be treated as a refusal.4 5
If an individual selects a test and submits to it, statutory presump-
tions may arise depending upon the test results.46 The recent statutory
amendments left unchanged the presumption that an individual with a
BAC of .05% or less is presumed not to be intoxicated;47 however, there
were three important changes regarding other statutory presumptions.
First, there is no statutory presumption of either intoxication or sobri-
ety with a BAC of .05 - .08%.48 This is a reduction from the previous
range of .05 - .10%.1 9 Second, a BAC of .08% is now prima facie
evidence that the defendant was driving while under the influence of
alcohol rather than the .10% previously required.50 Finally, the BAC
level that establishes prima facie evidence that the defendant was driv-
ing while intoxicated has been reduced from. 15% to .13%.51 Although
the admission of chemical evidence at trial may give rise to a presump-
tion of intoxication, it is not a prerequisite to obtaining a conviction. 52
Other evidence, such as the defendant's lack of normal psychomotor
skills, may be sufficient.53
If an individual demonstrates poor motor skills but has a low
blood alcohol content, it may indicate the use of drugs. Driving while
one's ability is impaired by drugs, or the combination of drugs and
alcohol, or while under the influence of any controlled dangerous sub-
stance are all violations of the law in Maryland. 54 The chemical test is
45. Id § 10-305(b) (Supp. 1981).
46. It has been alleged that blood-alcohol presumption statutes are a violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. One author advocates that such
statutes eliminate the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence. The
defendant is guilty until proven innocent, saddled with the burden of proving his
innocence. Taylor, Blood-Alcohol Presumptions. Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 53
CAL. ST. B.J. 170 (1978). This author also alleges that blood-alcohol presumption
statutes operate as a bill of attainder. Id
These statutory presumptions may not be used in civil proceedings unless
there is a full explanation to the jury regarding the meaning of the presumptions.
Fouche v. Masters, 47 Md. App. 11, 20, 420 A.2d 1279, 1284 (1980).
47. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(b) (1980).
48. Id § 10-307(c) (Supp. 1981).
49. Id (1980).
50. Compare MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(d) (1980) with MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(d) (Supp. 1981). Failure of § 21-902 of the
Transportation Code Annotated to provide specific definitions for the expressions
"under the influence" and "intoxicated" does not render subsections (a) and (b)
unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness. United States v. Channel, 423 F. Supp.
1017, 1027 (D. Md. 1976); Brooks v. State, 41 Md. App. 123, 127-29, 395 A.2d
1224, 1227-28 (1979).
51. Compare MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(e) (1980) with MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(e) (Supp. 1981).
52. Major v. State, 31 Md. App. 590, 595, 358 A.2d 609, 613, cert. denied, 278 Md. 722
(1976).
53. Id The introduction of chemical evidence, however, does not limit the introduc-
tion of other evidence. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-308 (1981).
54. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-902 (1977). It is not a valid defense that the person
was entitled under the laws of the state to use the drugs, unless the person was
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unable to detect the presence of either drugs or controlled dangerous
substances;5 5 therefore, an infraction can only be proven by circum-
stantial evidence.
IV. IMPOSITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
A. The Point System
The Administration maintains a point system whereby points are
assessed against an individual's license for a violation of the motor ve-
hicle laws. 6 Upon assessment of an enumerated amount of points, an
individual's license may be suspended or revoked. In most instances
suspension occurs when eight points are accumulated57 and revocation
occurs when twelve points are assessed.58 The offense of driving while
under the influence of alcohol constitutes a six-point infraction59 and
driving while intoxicated is a twelve-point infraction.60 Consequently,
driving while under the influence does not represent a "suspendable"
offense, yet driving while intoxicated represents a "revocable"
offense.61
B. Suspension
Notwithstanding the point system, a license may be suspended for
unaware that the drugs or combination of drugs and alcohol would make him
incapable of driving a vehicle safely. Id
55. Yoder Interview, supra note 10. The presence of amphetamines, barbituates, di-
lantin, librium, methadone, opium alkaloids, salicylates, and valium are some of
the substances that may be detected by a drug screening test. State v. Moon, 291
Md. 463, 466, 436 A.2d 420, 421 (1981).
56. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (Supp. 1981).
57. Id § 16-404(3)(i). "Suspend," as used in reference to any license to drive a vehi-
cle, means to withdraw temporarily, by formal action of the Administration an
individual's license to drive a motor vehicle on highways in this state, but only for
a period specifically designated by the Administration. Id § 11-164 (1977).
58. Id § 16-404(3)(ii) (Supp. 1981). "Revoke," as used in reference to any license to
drive a vehicle, means to terminate, by formal action of the Administration, an
individual's license to drive a motor vehicle on highways in this state. Id § 11-
150 (1977).
59. Id § 16-402(a)(14) (Supp. 1981).
60. Id § 16-402(a)(22).
61. Special provisions, however, allow an individual who is required to drive in the
regular course of business to accumulate sixteen points before suspension occurs
and nineteen points before revocation. Id § 16-405(c).
The Transportation Code Annotated does not define one "who drives in the
regular course of business." Therefore, it is a factual issue within the discretion of
the administrative hearing officer. A letter from the motorist's employer is usually
necessary to prove he is required to drive in the regular course of his business.Bricker Interview, supra note 35. An individual forfeits these provisions, how-
ever, if his current accumulation of points includes points received as a result of a
conviction for an alcohol-related offense. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-405(c)
(Supp. 1981). If suspension or revocation would adversely affect the employment
or opportunity of employment, the Administration may decline, cancel or modify
the order of suspension or revocation. Id § 16-405(a).
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either of two alcohol-related offenses. First, an individual's license
may be suspended for refusing to submit to chemical testing. 62 Second,
a license may be suspended for a violation of driving while under the
influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs.
63
C. Revocation
In addition to the point system, the Administration may revoke the
license of any person convicted of driving while intoxicated or while
under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance. 64 Further-
more, the Administration may revoke an individual's license if, within
a three-year period, he is convicted of three or more violations of driv-
ing while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
alcohol and drugs.65
D. Probation Before Judgment
Whenever a person pleads guilty, is found guilty, or pleads nolo
contendere to an alcohol offense, a court of criminal jurisdiction may
stay the entering of the judgment, defer further proceedings, and place
the individual on probation if the accused consents and it is in the best
interests of the accused and the state.66 If the offense for which judg-
ment is being stayed is a violation of either driving while intoxicated or
driving while under the influence of alcohol, the court may require that
the accused participate in an alcohol treatment or education program
as a condition of probation.67
Maryland now records probation before judgment dispositions on
an individual's driving record.6" This recordation requirement, how-
62. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(b) (Supp. 1981); see text accompanying note
35 supra
63. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(b) (Supp. 1981). For a single offense the
Administration may not suspend the license of the individual for more than 60
days. Id If the individual is convicted twice within a three-year period, the indi-
vidual's license may not be suspended for more than 120 days. Id § 16-205.1(c).
In Pieri v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 192 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1963), the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals held the defendant's acquittal on charges of driv-
ing while intoxicated did not prevent the Director of Motor Vehicles from revok-
ing his driving permit on that ground. Id at 808. The validity of Pieri in
Maryland seems doubtful because the suspension statute requires a conviction
before the Administration can act. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 11-110(a) (1977).
If an individual drives a motor vehicle while his license is suspended or re-
voked, the Administration may suspend, for not more than 120 days, the registra-
tion of any motor vehicle owned by that person. Law of May 3, 1982, ch. 94, Md.
Laws 1221 (to be codified at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 13-705.1).
64. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205(a)(1) (Supp. 1981).
65. Id § 16-205(a)(2).
66. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641(a) (Supp. 1981).
67. Id
68. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-117(b)(2) (Supp. 1981). Probation before judg-
ment dispositions may be expunged from one's driving record, Bricker Interview,
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ever, is only applicable to alcohol-related offenses. 69 Furthermore,
these records must be segregated by the Administration, the courts, the
criminal justice system, and the defendant.7" These records may not be
received or considered by a court until after a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere by the defendant or a finding of guilt.7 These records are
also available to the Administration when considering any license revo-
cation or at any other suitable time.7
E Reinstatement
If a license has been suspended for an alcohol-related offense, the
Administration will immediately return the license or reinstate the
privilege to drive upon the expiration of the suspension, unless the li-
cense has been refused, revoked, or cancelled under any other provi-
sion of the Maryland vehicle laws.73 With respect to a license that has
been revoked for a DWI offense, the Administration may reinstate the
license six months after receipt of the revoked license.74 Reinstatement
may only occur, however, after the Administration has investigated the
character, habits, and driving ability of the individual and is satisfied
supra note 35, subject to the provisions of Law of May 3, 1982, ch. 99, 1982 Md.
Laws 1248 (to be codified at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-117.1).
Under the prior law, probation before judgment dispositions were not re-
corded. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-117(b) (1977). Thus, an individual
could have been arrested several times on charges of drunk driving but if he re-
ceived probation before judgment on each offense, there would be no method of
ascertaining his previous record. An individual with a history of previous drunk
driving charges could, therefore, proceed through the system undetected.
A court may not enter probation before judgment for a second or subsequent
finding of guilt under section 21-902(a) or (b) of the Transportation Code. Law of
May 31, 1982, ch. 98, 1982 Md. Laws 1246 (to be codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 641(a)(2)).
69. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-117(b)(2) (Supp. 1981).
70. Id The statute further provides that employees of the Administration may not
disclose any information regarding probation before judgment dispositions. Id
It should be noted, however, that segregation of records is contrary to the usual
policy that all records of the Administration are public records and open to in-
spection. Id § 12-111(b) (1977).
71. Id
72. Id § 16-117(b)(3). The Administration currently considers probation before
judgment dispositions when determining whether one is unfit to have a driver's
license. Bricker Interview, .supra note 35. An insurer of an automobile insurance
policy may not consider a probation before judgment disposition which is re-
corded with the Administration for purposes of reclassifying an individual and
requiring a higher premium. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 242(c)(7)(iv) (Supp.
1981).
73. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205(d) (Supp. 1981).
74. Law of May 3, 1982, ch. 97, 1982 Md. Laws 1244 (to be codified at MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 16-208(b)). A license that has been revoked for a violation of the
point system under either § 16-402 or § 16-405 may not be reinstated unless the
holder of the license passes a new examination per § 16-110. MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 16-404(d) (1977).
An aggrieved party to a hearing may appeal from a decision or order of the
Administration to the circuit court. Id § 12-209.
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that it will be safe to grant the privilege to drive.75
V. COMMENTARY
The changes in Maryland's law will facilitate the detection and
punishment of drunk drivers but will not deter them. It is the problem
drinker, not the social drinker, who presents the major threat on the
highways.76 Traditional enforcement methods of fines, suspensions,
and revocations do not keep the problem drinker off the road.77 Prob-
lem drinkers have the highest number of arrests for driving without a
license; therefore, removing their license does not prevent them from
driving.
78
In an effort to ameliorate this problem the Administration recently
adopted a program whereby the social drinker would attend an alcohol
education class, and the problem drinker would be required to enter
and complete an alcohol rehabilitation program.79 Deterrence by reha-
bilitation has demonstrated some success in a number of jurisdictions;
however, it has not eliminated the problem.80
75. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-208(b)(4) (1977).
76. Deterring the Drinking Driver. Treatment vs. Punishment, 7 UCLA-ALAsKA L.
REV. 244, 253 (1978).
77. Wagner, Problem Drinking v. Public Safety, TRIAL, May-June 1971, at 26, 30. In
addition, studies have shown that mandatory jail sentences do not deter the driver
who drinks. Robertson, Jail Sentencesfor Driving While Intoxicated in Chicago. A
Judicial Policy that Failed, 8 LAW & Soc'y REV. 55 (1973).
78. Strimbeck, Driving While Intoxicated Should Not be TreatedAs a Criminal Matter,
16 N.H.B.J. 214 (1974).
79. See The Evening Sun (Baltimore), Aug. 7, 1981, at AI, col. 5. The Administration
will also be instituting a program whereby all drivers charged with an alcohol-
related offense will be clinically evaluated to separate the problem drinker from
the social drinker. Bricker Interview, supra note 35.
80. For example, under the Phoenix Plan, which was developed in Arizona, a driver's
treatment consisted of four steps:
(1) the driver is educated concerning the effects of alcohol consumption;
(2) the driver is helped to understand the causes of excessive alcohol
use;
(3) the driver is encouraged to recognize the nature and extent of his
personal drinking problem; and
(4) the driver is encouraged to seek help and is assisted in contacting
existing rehabilitation services in his, community, such as Alcoholics
Anonymous.
Kuttler & Farrell, D. WL. - Jail or Rehabilitation, 47 FLA. B.J. 232 (1973). When
the Phoenix Plan was implemented in Florida, the recidivism rate for DWI of-
fenders dropped from twenty percent to one percent. Id
The Homer Alternative Work Program, which was developed in Alaska, was
based upon deterrence through rehabilitation. Under the Homer plan, drivers
were under the personal supervision of program personnel and were required to
attend counseling sessions. In addition to obtaining alcoholism treatment, drivers
were required to donate time to community projects. Deterring the Drinking
Driver: Treatment vs. Punishment, 7 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 244, 260-63 (1978).
For an article discussing additional treatment plans, see Cameron, The Impact of
Drinking-Driving Countermeasures: A Review and Evaluation, 8 CONTEMP. DRUG
PROBS. 495 (1979).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Detection and punishment of the drunk driver will be enhanced as
a result of the new laws. These new laws, in cooperation with the Ad-
ministration's program, will help remove the problem drinker from the
highway. Their ultimate effectiveness, however, remains to be seen.
Christopher W Nicholson
